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Abstract
If the universe expands exponentially without end, “ordinary observers” like our-
selves may be vastly outnumbered by “Boltzmann’s brains,” transient observers who
briefly flicker into existence as a result of quantum or thermal fluctuations. One
might then wonder why we are so atypical. I show that tiny changes in physics—
for instance, extremely slow variations of fundamental constants—can drastically
change this result, and argue that one should be wary of conclusions that rely on
exact knowledge of the laws of physics in the very distant future.
The fact that we observe an orderly universe is in part a characteristic of the universe,
but also in part a characteristic of us. It is easy to understand why we should see order—
we are descended from a long line of evolutionary ancestors who successfully navigated their
local universe long enough to reproduce, while competitors who were unable to correctly
perceive the patterns of their environment were unlikely to have had descendants. As Rees [1],
Dyson et al. [2], and Page [3–5] have pointed out, though, another kind of “observer” is
possible: a “Boltzmann’s brain” [6], a transient observer appearing briefly as the result of a
thermal or quantum fluctuation.∗ The probability that a fluctuation in a given four-volume
will produce anything that we would call an observer is, of course, extraordinarily small. But
in an exponentially expanding, eternal universe, such “Boltzmann’s brains” are inevitable, and
under reasonable circumstances might vastly outnumber ordinary observers like ourselves.
There is no reason to expect that such transient observers would experience an ordered
universe, much less one with the particular order we see. We might thus ask why our observa-
tions are so atypical. Whether this is a cause for worry is debatable, but at least for anthropic
arguments, it seems to be a real concern: it is hard to argue that the universe should be suited
to observers like us if typical observers are so completely different.
A number of solutions to this puzzle have been proposed. If the number of ordinary
observers and the number of “Boltzmann’s brains” are both infinite, then the relative prob-
ability depends on the choice of measure, and choices exist for which ordinary observers pre-
dominate [8, 9]. Or perhaps the universe decays very rapidly [3, 5]—or, with a “holographic”
∗The term “Boltzmann’s brain” is a reference to Boltzmann’s argument [7] that our ordered, low entropy
universe could simply be a local thermal fluctuation in a much larger thermalized universe. Given this possibility,
it is easy to see that it is much more likely for a fluctuation to merely produce an isolated “observer.”
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measure, not so rapidly [10]—and “Boltzmann’s brains” never have time to appear. Or per-
haps a globally conservation laws forbid the fluctuations that could lead to the appearance of
observers [11].
One purpose of this note is to point out another simple possibility. The probability of
a given thermal or quantum fluctuation depends on the value of a number of dimensionless
parameters such as the fine structure constant and the electron-proton mass ratio. If these
parameters vary in time, even at a rate much slower than current experimental limits, the
creation of “Boltzmann’s brains” may be strongly suppressed.
Consider, for example, two of the “Boltzmann’s brains” discussed by Page in [4]. A “brief
brain” appears as a quantum fluctuation, with energy E, characteristic length r, and action
S ∼ Er/~c. For a “brain” containing N nucleons,
E ∼ Nmpc











(For N on the order of 104 times Avogadro’s number, this agrees with Page’s estimate [4] of
Sbb ∼ 10
42.) A “long brain” appears as a thermal fluctuation of de Sitter space, with an action






where HΛ = c
√
Λ/3 is the asymptotic Hubble constant.
The probability of a fluctuation goes roughly as e−S , while the four-volume (at least for a

















These are, of course, very crude approximations, involving order-of-magnitude estimates in the
exponents, but they give a reasonable qualitative picture. In particular, at present (HΛt ∼ 1)
the numbers are tiny, but as t increases, they grow without limit.
Implicit in this argument, however, is the assumption that the dimensionless parame-
ters appearing in S—the fine structure constant, the electron-proton mass ratio, etc.—are
independent of time. While this may be a reasonable starting point, it is by no means a
certainty. In Kaluza-Klein theories, for example, such constants depend on circumferences of
compact dimensions [12], which need not be time-independent; in string theory, they depend
on moduli whose dynamics can be quite complex [13]. Time-varying “constants” can appear in
quintessence models [14], in modifications of electromagnetism [15], in variable speed of light
models [16], and in brane world scenarios [17]; for more references, see [18]. So it is worth
examining the effect of relaxing the assumption of constancy.
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Let us therefore suppose that our “physical constants” can vary in time. Then the exponent









where µ1 = me/mp. This is about 36 orders of magnitude below present experimental limits
[19–25], and is not likely to be tested soon. For “long brains” the computation is slightly
more delicate, since one should only consider time dependence of dimensionless constants [26].
Here, the condition that the universe be asymptotically anti-de Sitter should presumably be
interpreted as a statement of the constancy of HΛ in Planck units. The relevant dimensionless







∼ 10−80 yr−1. (6)
I do not know of an experimental test of precisely this quantity, but Big Bang nucleosynthesis
places limits that depend on both mp andMPlanck, so, barring unexpected cancellations, should
limit variations of µ2. The time dependence (6) is then, optimistically, at least 67 orders of
magnitude below present observational limits [18,27] (see also [28]).
Over long enough times, of course, even slow variations of fundamental constants can lead
to profound changes in physics. If 1/α grows linearly at the minimum rate allowed by (5),
for instance, the electromagnetic interactions of two protons will become comparable to their
gravitational interactions in about 1090 yr . An increase in µ2 at the minimum rate allowed
by (6) will have the same effect in about 1099 yr . It has been conjectured that gravity cannot
become stronger than gauge interactions [29]; if this is the case, new physics would have to
come into play. In any case, it is unlikely in this scenario that “Boltzmann’s brains” in the far
future would look anything like the “observers” we now understand, and it is not clear that
such objects would be possible at all.
Should we thus conclude that our existence as observers implies a time dependence of
fundamental constants? Presumably not. There are many other changes in physics that could
lead to the same result, from a tunneling of the Higgs to a vacuum with no electroweak
symmetry breaking to a low energy breaking of color symmetry. At the same time, we have
only a limited understanding of what the requirements are for an “observer”: the weakless
universe [30] provides one illustration of how drastically ordinary physics could change without
eliminating observers.
Rather, the moral here is that we should be cautious about arguments that require precise
extrapolation of our present knowledge of physics to the very distant future. We have seen
that truly tiny changes in fundamental constants, many orders of magnitude below current
observational limits, are enough to vitiate the “Boltzmann’s brains” argument. Given the
uncertainties in our knowledge of physics and the extreme sensitivity of the analysis to such
uncertainties, it seems somewhat premature to draw conclusions about events 1042 years in
the future.
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